Towards formal verification of separation microkernel by Butterfield, Andrew et al.
TOWARDS FORMAL VERIFICATION OF A SEPARATION MICROKERNEL
Andrew Butterfield1, David Sana´n1, and Mike Hinchey2
1Lero. Trinity College Dublin
2Lero. University of Limerick
ABSTRACT
The best approach to verifying an IMA separa-
tion kernel is to use a (fixed) time-space parti-
tioning kernel with a multiple independent levels
of separation (MILS) architecture. We describe
an activity that explores the cost and feasibility
of doing a formal verification of such a kernel to
the Common Criteria (CC) levels mandated by
the Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP).
We are developing a Reference Specification of
such a kernel, and are using higher-order logic
(HOL) to construct formal models of this speci-
fication and key separation properties. We then
plan to do a dry run of part of a formal proof of
those properties using the Isabelle/HOL theorem
prover.
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of separation kernel was introduced
by Rushby (Rushby 1981) as a design approach
to formally verify complex security kernels. A
separation kernel can be considered as a kind of
security kernel that creates a virtual distributed
environment so each application runs in an en-
vironment isolated from other applications also
running in the system. In that way it can be
considered that applications are running on sep-
arate machines and the set of them comprises
the virtual distributed environment, in which they
can only communicate with each other through
the communications channels that the kernel pro-
vides.
A separation kernel is used to obtain high assur-
ance in critical systems, not only in those where
users access makes it necessary to ensure a se-
cure environment, but also in embedded systems
where it is necessary to have safe process exe-
cution and communication. Although the con-
cept of separation helps to design secure and safe
systems, kernel complexity results in design and
implementation errors so that functional and se-
curity properties do not hold. In order to ensure
systems correctness, formal methods techniques
have become widely used in what is known as
formal verification. Formal verification uses the-
orem proving to check that a formal model of
a system satisfies a set of properties given in a
formal specification, normally described in some
kind of logic. The most well known formal ver-
ification approaches are model checking (Clarke
et al. 2001) and deductive verification. The for-
mer is usually fully automatic but does not scale
well for big systems; the latter requires that the
user has a better knowledge of the system to ver-
ify, but it scales to large systems.
To that aim, within the project Methods and
Tools for On-Board Software Engineering1, we
are working on the functional and security re-
quirements specification, modelling, and verifi-
cation of a separation microkernel according to
the requirements baseline for the IMA-SP plat-
form (de Ferluc 2012) being developed as part
of ESTEC’s Savoir-IMA activity. It is a feasibil-
ity study into what would be required to verify
such a kernel to EAL Level 5+, as described by
the Common Criteria (CC) framework (Criteria
2005) and the Separation Kernel Protection Pro-
file (SKPP) (Directorate 2007).
The requirements specification describes the de-
sired kernel behaviour to handle partitions, inter-
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partition communication, memory management,
devices handling, trap handling, and fault detec-
tion, isolation, and recovery. The kernel archi-
tecture as described by this specification, includ-
ing kernel structure, data structures, and func-
tions provided by the kernel are to be modelled
in a high level formalism. To be able to carry
out the verification the model also needs to in-
clude a formal representation of the underlying
hardware, of the subset of C used, as well as
the assembly instructions use for low-level hard-
ware access. As regards the hardware model,
we consider a reliable architecture so only the
relevant components for the verification need to
be modelled, in particular those components like
the MMU where inappropriate setup and use can
lead to security violations.
It is worth to highlight that, in order to achieve
a full kernel verification, the verification has to
be performed at several levels of abstraction that
capture all the implementation details as shown
in the PSOS project (Feiertag & Neumann 1979),
one of the initial approaches for kernel verifica-
tion. For instance, the correctness of the spec-
ification over a high level abstraction model of
the kernel does not ensure the correctness of the
implementation and the assembly code. There-
fore for each architectural level a new layer of
abstraction capturing all the details has to be pro-
vided and verified, which increases the cost of
verification. However this cost can be reduced
using techniques like formal refinement. Formal
refinement verifies that the behaviour of a lower
(closer to implementation) layer satisfies the re-
quirements of a higher (closer to specification)
layer, typically using a concept known as forward
simulation. Forward simulation applies a refine-
ment relation over states belonging to different
abstraction layers in such a way that one layer re-
fines the other one if the successors of two states
related by the refinement relation belongs also to
the refinement relation, and the properties that
hold in the refined layer also hold in the refiner
layer.
The ongoing work will develop a high level
model that catches the significant behaviour of
the separation kernel requirements specification
and similarly for the underlying hardware (e.g.,
memory, MMU, traps, or general registers).
Then functional and separation requirements for
a separation kernel will be verified over the ab-
stract model. One important aspect to consider in
the development process is the scalability of the
verification. To that aim the models will be con-
structed with a high degree of orthogonality and
independence, so small changes in requirements
or in the implementation will have minimal ef-
fect on the verification of unaltered parts of the
system.
2. BACKGROUND: SEPARATION KER-
NEL CONCEPTS
The task of a separation kernel is to create an
environment which is indistinguishable from that
provided by a physically distributed system: it
must appear as if each regime is a separate, iso-
lated machine and that information can only flow
from one machine to another along known exter-
nal communications lines. (Rushby 1981)
Introduced by Rushby (Rushby 1981), separa-
tion concepts seek to simplify the design and
verification of a high assurance security model.
Previous attempts in the design of such secu-
rity models failed to set up a architecture simple
enough to make a sound verification feasible. Ba-
sically, there are two reasons for this. On the one
hand the presence of trusted processes made the
kernel verification complex. Some clear exam-
ples of trusted processes can be found in those
systems including printer or authentication ser-
vices, where such services needed to be consid-
ered as trusted processes, so becoming part of the
kernel, and therefore increasing the verification
complexity and effort. On the other hand, the
lack of certainty in their security models meant
they were not precise enough to capture the basic
characteristics of a security kernel to the degree
needed to provide a basis for sound verification.
Separation kernels are intended to solve these
problems by considering the system as a physi-
cal distributed system where the processes run-
ning in the kernel are independent machines in
that distributed system, and the secure kernel is
the mechanism to provide a virtual machine that
shows a unique view of the hardware for each
process, and to enforce logical separation be-
tween them. In order to perform logical sepa-
ration two aspects are considered: both spatial
and temporal separation of applications. On the
one hand, spatial separation assigns different re-
sources to each application, which results in ap-
plication isolation, whereas on the other hand,
temporal separation separates application activ-
ities in time. In effect, both temporal and spatial
separation concepts result in the notion of a par-
tition as an independent execution environment
for each process.
Although pure separated environments, that is
environments where partitions do not share any
information flow among them, are simple and
therefore can be easily verified (Rushby 1981),
actual systems need inter-partition communica-
tion. Since information flows break the spatial
separation principle, the separation kernel pro-
tection profile (SKPP) (Directorate 2007) estab-
lishes a Partition Information Flow Policy (PIFP)
that the kernel enforces so that only appropriate
flow of information is allowed. So, partitions can
only communicate with others by using flows ex-
plicitly permitted by the PIFP.
Going back to the problems related with trusted
processes in previous secure kernels, separation
kernels allow us to construct hierarchical archi-
tectures where those services provided by trusted
processes can be implemented as top layers of the
separation kernel. This allows trusted processes
that use separation kernel services to develop the
require functionality without augmenting the ker-
nel complexity, making the trusted process and
kernel verification independent of each other. So,
the MILS architecture (Alves-Foss et al. 2006)
provides applications layers with mechanisms to
control, manage and enforce application level se-
curity policies.
The concept of separation was redefined by
Alves-Foss et al. in (Alves-Foss et al. 2002)
to consider the concepts of virtual machines for
separation used by Rushby and of environment
observability independence proposed by Hardin
et al. in (Matthew et al. 2003): The behaviour
and performance of software in one partition
must be unaffected by the software in other parti-
tions except through communication through au-
thorized communications channels.
3. STATE OF THE ART
The use of formal methods for kernel verifica-
tion dates back to the end of the 70’s. Al-
though formal verification tools were not mature
enough, and no full implementation proofs were
given, UCLA Secure Unix (Popek et al. 1979),
PSOS (Feiertag & Neumann 1979), and KIT (Be-
vier 1989) were the first steps at operating sys-
tem formal verification. Despite of the lack of
proofs, these projects settled the methodologies
to achieve full kernel verification such as a lay-
ered architecture, and refinement based proofs
where the correctness of abstract layers allows
the inference of the correctness of the concrete
layers.
Later in the 2000s, the verification technology
was mature enough to support the verification of
a new generation of microkernels, such as L4.
So, VFiasco (Hohmuth & Tews 2005), target-
ing the kernel Fiasco belonging to the L4 family,
became successful in verifying some list proper-
ties. Also important to highlight is the Verisoft
activity (Alkassar et al. 2008) that performed the
pervasive verification of a system from the ap-
plication layer, going through a microkernel, and
a compiler, to the hardware. The importance
of separation/partitioned micro-kernels has mot-
vated up new efforts in the verification of new se-
cure kernels like seL4, or PikeOS, based on the
separation paradigm and with a MILS-compliant
architecture. The seL4.verified kernel (Boyton
2009) targets the high-assurance kernel market.
It uses a three step refinement based proof verifi-
cation to verify an abstract specification, an exe-
cutable specification, and finally a C implemen-
tation. They initially aimed to verify purely func-
tional requirements, although the properties ver-
ified do cover security-related aspects like buffer
overflows, or memory leaks. The Verisoft project
has been followed by Verisoft XT, which targets
different OS, one among them being the sep-
aration micro-kernel PikeOS. Verisoft XT aims
at the verification of PikeOS functional require-
ments while being in non-concurrent mode by
disabling the interrupts.
With regard to the separation kernel proofs,
Rushby (Rushby 1981) initially described an
approach to the separation problem for non-
interfering systems, and later on for partitioned
systems sharing communications channels (John
1999). In 2002, Alves-Foss et al. (Alves-Foss
et al. 2002) give a proof of separation for a formal
model over a machine model based on a stack ar-
chitecture, the Idaho Partitioning Machine. Fi-
nally, it is worth pointing out some recent work
in Verisoft XT and sel4.verified that focus on
separation properties. So, VerisoftXT in (Bau-
mann et al. 2011) verify partition memory sepa-
ration with strict separation, and no communica-
tion among partitions. The sel4.verified project
recently proved, in (Murray et al. 2013) an infor-
mation flow non-interference property, claiming
that sel4 can be considered as a separation kernel.
4. MTOBSE
Figure 1. Separation Kernel Design
The project Methods and Tools for On-Board
Software Engineering (MTOBSE), in collabora-
tion with the European Space Agency (ESA), in-
tends to address key issues in the on-board soft-
ware domain, in particular the formalization of
Time and Space Partitioning kernels, by apply-
ing software engineering methodologies. To that
aim MTOBSE defines a set of activities which
include the generation of a reference specifica-
tion for a separation micro-kernel, the evalua-
tion of suitable tools and formalisms for its for-
mal verification, the modelling of a separation
micro-kernel in the selected formalism based on
the reference specification firstly generated, to fi-
nally end up with a verification trial and feasibil-
ity study.
4.1. Reference Specification
The developed reference specification consists
of software requirements (Butterfield & Sanan
2013c), interface requirements (Butterfield &
Sanan 2013b), and the architectural design (But-
terfield & Sanan 2013a). Both the software re-
quirements and the interface requirements are
specified following the requirements baseline for
the IMA-SP platform (de Ferluc 2012), and
ESA’s own suggestions. Based on the speci-
fied requirements, the architectural design pro-
vides the data structures, component internal in-
terfaces, and component functionalities.
The main sources from which the software re-
quirements are drawn are the Arinc-653 standard
specification (ARINC 2005) for functional re-
quirements (partitioning aspects) and the Sepa-
ration Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) (Direc-
torate 2007) for security requirements (separa-
tion aspects). Although the provided reference
specification is guided these standards, it does
not intend to be compliance with them. So,
in the case of the partitioning requirements, al-
though the specification is compliant with parti-
tion, scheduling, inter-partition communication,
and time requirements, the ones for processes,
intra-partition communication, or health monitor
are not, since according to ESA the management
of those aspects are handled by a partition guest
OS or a system partition.
In the case of security and separation require-
ments this reference specification follows SKPP
indications, and it includes adapted requirements
tailored to the space environment for audit, user
data protection, identification and authentication,
security management, protection of the security
functions, and resource utilisation.
Figure 4 shows the diagram for the architec-
tural design. It includes the necessary compo-
nents according to the reference specification,
that is: Partition core to manage partitions; Com-
munication core for Inter-partition communica-
tion; Time management core to provide parti-
tions with global and local time; Health monitor
core to handle software and hardware exceptions
not concerned with the kernel security function-
ality; Trap core to mange the interrupts and de-
vices; and finally the Kernel Security Functions
core, which is in charge of security requirements
as specified in the SKPP. User and System parti-
tions can access the functionality the kernel pro-
vides through the interface these modules imple-
ment.
4.2. Formalism and Tool Evaluation
Formal verification involves the modelling of the
system and the properties to be verified in some
formal language, which later on will be automat-
ically or semi-automatically analysed by a veri-
fication tool. The selection of the formalism or
the methodology the kernel is going to be mod-
elled with is non-trivial since the language fea-
tures, as well as the available tools supporting the
selected formalism to carry out the verification,
determine the feasibility and cost of the verifica-
tion. For instance, is the chosen formalism ex-
pressive enough to model all the kernel and the
hardware characteristics? Is it possible to fully
formalize the desired properties to be verified?
Do any the available tools for that formalism per-
form a sound and complete verification?
In (Butterfield & Sanan 2012) we given a de-
scription of desired features and whether the
evaluated formalism and tools fulfill them or not.
In a nutshell, the considered features for this
evaluation are the following: expressivity of the
formalism, how easy it scales for lager models,
what semantics are available, is it suitable for
modelling of hardware, which are the available
tools for the formalism/methodology, which is
its scope of verification, track-record of previous
verification efforts in the kernel area, and its flex-
ibility to adapt verification requirements.
Considering those features two tools were con-
sidered suitable for the verification: the theorem
prover Isabelle/HOL (Nipkow et al. 2002), which
is based in high order logic and is able to en-
code different logics like first order logic or sep-
aration logic, and VCC (Cohen et al. 2009) an
automated assistance for verifying C programs,
which uses inline annotation on the source code
to which is possible to add pre and post condi-
tions and type invariants as well. Eventually, Is-
abelle/Hol was selected as the formalism/tool to
perform the verification. The main reasons for
this selection were the availability of a formal se-
mantics for the C language, and the open source
nature of the tools, with the support of a big com-
munity of developers.
5. VERIFICATION APPROACH
As mentioned in Section 3, layered architecture
based modelling and refinement based verifica-
tion methodologies have been established as effi-
cient and successful approaches for OS verifica-
tion. On the one hand layered architectures or-
ganise and bind different degrees of system ab-
stractions following a top-bottom design from
high abstraction levels to concrete implementa-
tions. On the other hand, refinement verification
links the different levels of abstraction so the re-
sult of the verification performed in the higher
levels can be propagated to the lower ones. The
greater simplicity of the abstraction level reduces
the cost of the verification with regard to the con-
crete model, therefore the verification of sepa-
ration properties will be performed in the ab-
stract level. Later on, those verified properties
will be inferred in the concrete implementation
by means of refinement.
5.1. An Abstract Model for the Separation
Kernel
Modelling an abstraction from the functional and
security requirements specified in (Butterfield &
Sanan 2013c) requires us to consider not only
the kernel functionality defining the kernel be-
haviour, but also to consider those hardware as-
pects that influence system behaviour (e.g. CPU
registers and timers, which are involved in the
context switch), as well as those concerning the
properties to verify (e.g. the MMU, which en-
forces spatial separation). It is worth noting that
at this stage of the project the hardware is be-
ing considered as a reliable component, so it is
being modelled at the higher level of abstraction
needed to support the required properties.
So far, the abstracted model is made up of
more than 27 theories modelling levels from
hardware up through kernel types and func-
tional specifications. The hardware is com-
posed of the theories SparcV8MachineTypes,
MachineTypes, MMU, and MachineState. The-
ory SparcV8MachineTypes models the necessary
CPU data types like physical and virtual mem-
ory addresses word types, respectively specified
as 36 and 32 bit words; virtual pages word types,
specified as 32 bit words; or CPU, user, and timer
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Figure 2. State Definition Model Theory Graph
record state=
p_state ::partitionManagerState
com_state ::communication_state
trap_state ::trap_state
h_m_state :: health_monitor_state
machine :: machine_state
ksf :: ksf_state
Figure 3. State Definition Model in Isabelle/Hol
registers. This model is specific for the Sparc V8
processor and it is wrapped up by MachineTypes,
which is used by all the machine-type dependent
theories so the model can be easily changed work
with other hardware specifications, by modelling
the new hardware platform separately, and using
MachineTypes as an interface. The MMU the-
ory models the physical memory and the virtual
memory as well, modelling the notion of con-
texts to perform memory separation. Contexts
are a dedicated set of pages assigned to each par-
tition, so a partition in a specific context cannot
access other memory areas different to the ones
assigned to its context. In addition to the main
memory, MMU also models basic cache func-
tionality. Both the MMU and the cache are nec-
essary to define spatial separation properties, and
additionally the cache behaviour is important to
ensure “sanitisation” properties.
The hardware is accessed by the kernel through a
machine state type containing these theories and
specified by MachineState theory. In addition to
the MMU, the CPU and users registers, and the
timers, the machine state includes a unspecified
model for the unused hardware that can be used
in some abstracted functionality.
The kernel model includes the definition of a
global kernel state shown in Figure 3 to keep the
state of the major components of the kernel de-
fined by the reference specification, as explained
in section 4: Partition Management; Communi-
cation Management; Trap Management; Health
Monitor Management; and the Kernel Security
Functions. The Kernel Security Functions also
depend on the models for memory, scheduler,
and information flow policies to provide spatial
and temporal isolation. Figure 2 shows the Is-
abell/Hol theories architecture for the kernel state
definition and its dependant theories. On the top
of the kernel state definition are the theories mod-
elling the security and functionality of the kernel.
Hardware and software exceptions are modelled
in the Exception theory (not shown), which cap-
tures software and hardware errors.
5.2. Verifying the Kernel
As mentioned above the higher complexity of
the concrete kernel implementation with regard
to the abstract model, where data structures
and functionalities are simplified to the mini-
mum level necessary to describe the require-
ments, makes a refinement methodology suitable
to simplify the cost of the verification. So, func-
tional and security requirements are proven in
the abstracted model first, and then refinement by
means of forward simulation will support the ver-
ification of these properties on the concrete ker-
nel implementation.
The verification will be focussed to prove cor-
rectness of system calls provided by the kernel,
and security properties. Abstract kernel system
calls correctness will be proved using pre- and
post-conditions, which ensure that system calls
meet their functional requirements. On the other
hand security properties will be verified using in-
variants showing that every time a data structure
involved in some security property is modified
the property is preserved. Another important as-
pect to consider in the verification is task termi-
nation. For that, Isabelle/Hol ensures termination
for non-recursive definitions and provides sup-
port to prove termination of recursive functions,
easing the proof of termination for most of the
kernel functions.
Once the abstracted kernel has been successfully
verified, we need to obtain the concrete model
from the kernel implementation and to apply for-
ward simulation between the abstract model and
the concrete model. A concrete kernel model can
be obtained using a semantic model of the im-
plementation language over the source code. Al-
though this is indeed a hard process, some related
work like the tool developed by NICTA in (Nor-
rish 2008) simplify this step. This tool uses a
semantic model for C and it translates a program
written in C into an Isabelle/Hol model. Thanks
to this, a kernel implementation in C can be trans-
lated to Isabelle, it only being necessary to pro-
vide semantics for some assembly instructions,
and perhaps performing some modification in the
kernel code to adapt it to the particularities of the
semantic model provided by this tool.
Forward simulation is applied by defining a re-
lation R between states belonging to the abstract
and the concrete kernels. Briefly, when abstract
and concrete versions of an operation αa,αc are
applied to corresponding states related by R, if
the resulting states are also related by R then it
can be inferred that the properties verified in the
abstract model are also satisfied in the concrete
model.
6. FUTURE WORK
So far, an abstract model based on the refer-
ence specification is under construction. After
the model is finished, and using some available
kernel (e.g. Air, PikeOS, or Xtratum) a concrete
model from the source code will be obtained us-
ing the NICTA tool ”C-to-Isabelle”. As final
step, refinement techniques will be applied to the
verification in orde to assess feasibility and prob-
able cost.
No doubt, this initial verification can be extended
to verify further levels, like the compiler or the
whole hardware architecture. Moreover, the ab-
stract model can be extended to support other ar-
chitectures, like multi-core processors, or other
microprocessors different to SPARC like ARM.
Finally, one of the biggest concerns of using for-
mal verification to ensure a kernel correctness
is the cost of this verification. Even applying
methodologies like refinement, which helps to
reduce the verification time and cost, the whole
verification of a kernel, can take a long time. For
instance, in (Klein et al. 2010) the total cost of the
their functional verification effort was estimated
at 25 person-years, without checking separation
properties. However, the verification cost can be
significantly reduced using a kernel design that
does not using complex mechanisms as found in
sel4, such as dynamic memory so it holds to the
maxim of Rushby’s separation kernel: keep it the
simplest possible.
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